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ABSTRACT
This thesis traces the development of Section 1498 of Title 28 of
the United States Code. This section deals with the unlicensed use of
patents by the United States Government.
The effect of this statute and its interpretations by the Comp-
troller General of the United States in Government procurement situations
is examined. The effects of these interpretations and their impact on
the patent holder, licensee and unlicensed contractor are examined.
Research was based heavily on the decisions of the Federal courts
and the Comptroller General. Additional research was accumulated from
published sources, both legally and commercially oriented.
Finally, recommendations are provided which could improve the
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Art. 1, Sec. 8. The Congress shall have the power ... To promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respec-
tive writings and discoveries.
The Constitution of the United States
We believe that the statute [28 U.S.C. 1498] is not consistent with
any duty on the part of a contracting agency of the Government to
protect the interests of patentees or licensees with respect to
articles which it proposes to purchase ...
The Comptroller General
(38 Decs. Comp. Gen 276 (1958))
There is a pressing need for this legislation, due to certain pro-
curement policies which are presently being followed by Federal
Government agencies, particularly the Department of Defense. Under
these policies American patents are being knowingly and deliberately
infringed for whatever reason the particular procuring agency deems
appropriate, which not only violates Congressional intent, but
adversely affects the economy of our country both domestically and
internationally.
Remarks by Senator Williams (D -
New Jersey), introducing Senate
Bill S. 731, on the floor of the
Senate, January 30, 1967
The application of Section 1498 of Title 28 of the United States
Code in Government contracts has provided a blanket of security and at
the same time been the vehicle for litigation against the United States.
The first two paragraphs of 28 U.S.C. 1498 state, in effect, that when
an invention is used in the execution of a government contract, without
the license of the owner or other legal rights, but with the authorization

or consent of the Government, the patent holder may seek relief only
against the Government.
It is important to note the phrase "authorization or consent" which
indicates that either action, authorization or consent; may be grounds for
action under 28 U.S.C. 1498. Here we have a situation whereby a contractor
may with impunity infringe the patent of another and yet not be libel in
a court of law. Of course, there are other factors involved such as actual
or implied authorization or consent, indemnification provisions whereby
the ultimate liability for infringement may rest with the contractor, and
the type of contract involved. The details of these and other factors
will be addressed later.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to show that existing procurement
regulations and decisions actually contribute to the unauthorized use
of patents. A result of unauthorized use of patents is that the patent
holder may attempt to gain some form of compensation from the agency
involved. Actions by the patent holder are costly and time consuming
for all involved.
Recommendations will be set forth which could materially aid in the
reduction of "unauthorized use" protests and claims, and would restore
some degree of exclusivity to the patent holder.
28 U.S.C. 1498 (a): "Whenever an invention described in and covered
by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the
United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use
or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by action against
the United States in the Court of Claims for the recovery of his reason-
able and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.
For the purpose of this section, the use of manufacture of an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor,
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government
and with the authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed
as use of manufacture for the United States ..."

C. METHODOLOGY
The preponderance of the background material for this thesis was
obtained from printed works, both published and unpublished. Extensive
use was made of the Legal Information Thru Electronics (LITE) information
retrieval system, in Denver, Colorado.
The thesis is constructed along historical lines, tracing the back-
ground and development of 28 U.S.C. 1498 (hereinafter referred to as
simply "1498"). A discussion of major interpretations of authorization
and consent, specific clauses, and finally recommendations for improvement
are presented. The subject of "authorization and consent" is only one




Patent laws are not set forth in Title 35 of the United States Code.
35 U.S.C. 261 confers upon a patent the attributes of personal property
and therefore, the patent may be the subject of litigation. However,
the granting of a patent does not confer upon its owner the exclusive
right to use the invention in a specific manner, but to exclude others
2
from so doing without permission.
The "others" referred to does not mean the United States Government.
Suits against the United States, arising out of contracts, are permitted
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1491 (1964), originally passed in 1887
3
as the Tucker Act. Therefore, it might be reasonably asked what purpose
is served by 1498 previously mentioned. The crucial element in litigation
pursued under the provisions of the Tucker Act is whether or not a con-
tract, implied or expressed, did in fact exist. Subsequent to the pas-
sage of the Tucker Act, a landmark case pointed the need for some form
of compensatory action available to a patent holder whose patent had
been infringed. In the case of Schillinger v. United States , it was
determined that the use of a patent by the United States without the
owner's consent was not sufficient to execute a contract. It was simply
2
Aerospace Industries Association, Inventions and Patents in Government
Contracting
,
June 1971, p. 2.
28 U.S.C. 1491: "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either





a tort. Since torts (a wrong committed against the person or property
of another; separate from a contract action) were excluded under the
provisions of the Tucker Act, the only recourse would have been a
bill passed by Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
which authorizes the payment of debts of the United States. So in the
absence of a contract, the patent owner was without a forum for redress.
By the turn of the century, there had been a rather obvious chain of
events which preceded meaningful patent infringement legislation. The
Government refused to be sued, so persons owning patents who sought
relief were reduced to suing the individuals employed by the Government.
Finally, in Carr v. United States , the responsibility for the development
6
of appropriate legislation was laid at the doorstep of Congress. It
should be noted that the Tucker Act was passed in 1887, nine years after
the Carr decision, but over 20 years prior to patent infringement
legislation.
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT
The legislative history of 1498 begins in 1910. The Act of 1910,
passed by the 61st Congress, was a major step towards obtaining a
forum for relief for patent holders. The thrust of the Act of 1910
was to provide that a patentee could recover "reasonable compensation"
4Schillinger v. United States
,
155 U.S. 163 (1894).
TeSelle, John, "Authorization or Consent to Infringe Patents in
Production for the Government," G. W. Law Review
,
Vol. 26, April 1958,
p. 584.
6
Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433, 437 (1878).

by a suit against the Government in the Court of Claims. There is no
mention of injunctive relief as is available in civil action. 35 U.S.C.
281 provides a patent holder, "... remedy by civil action for infringe-
ment of his patent . . .." The premise of injunctive relief was tested
in the case of Crozier v. Krupp . Crozier was the Chief of Ordnance of
the Army, and in 1911, the United States was manufacturing guns based
on a patent held by Krupp. The basis for litigation was not for the
recovery of damages, but simply to obtain an injunction preventing further
work. The Supreme Court in the Crozier decision was very clear in stating
that the United States Government by its own doing had consented to be
sued under the Act of 1910, and therefore, held the high card regarding
injunctive relief; there would be none! In addition, the doctrine of
eminent domain was applied.
There are two important points to be born in mind at this early stage
in the legislative history of infringement. First, there is no third
party involved. The suit rests with the patent holder and the United
States (its agent in this case) and second, was there any authorization
or consent involved on the part of the Government? These two questions
were in part laid to rest by subsequent cases. However, the philosophy
that since the Government has the right of eminent domain, injunctive
relief is meaningless, was to undergo a marked change in direction.
Act of June 25, 1910, c. 423, 36 Stat. 851: "That whenever an
invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States shall
hereafter be used by the United States without license of the owner
thereof or lawful right to use the same, the owner may recover reasonable




22A U.S. 290 (1911): "This construction of the
act is consistent with a denial of injunctive relief .... Under the
circumstances now existing, that is, the acquiring by the Government
under the right of eminent domain, as a result of the statute of 1910,
of a license to use the patented inventions in question, there could be
not possible right to award at the end of the trial, the permanent
injunction to which the issue in the case was confined . . ."
9

In the case of Cramp and Sons v. Curtis Turbine Company , the Supreme
Court ruled that a contractor doing business for the Government (in this
case, Cramp and Sons) was not coequal with the Government under the
91910 act. Furthermore, this case paved the way for a decision of injunc-
tive relief. In the case of Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America
v . S imon
,
an injunction was in fact granted. Here is a case where a
contractor doing business for the government was the subject of an
10
injunction. Notice that in this case as well as in those mentioned
previously, the litigants were private parties; the United States Govern-
ment was not a party.
Immediately subsequent to the Cramp decision, Acting Secretary of
the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, on April 20, 1918, made an impassioned
plea to Congress for a refinement of the Act of 1910 which would preclude
an injunction against a Government contractor. With unusual swiftness,
Congress passed the Act of July 1, 1918, Ch. 114, 40 Stat. 705, which
became known as the Amendment of 1918. This amendment included government
contractors under the protection of the Act of 1910. However well-meaning
the legislators intentions may have been in the development of these
statutes, there remained yet more loopholes to be plugged. An example
is the Wood case.
q
Cramp and Sons v. Curtis Turbine Co ., 246 U.S. 28 (1918).




For a reproduction of Mr. Roosevelt's letter and Congressional
response, see TeSelle, supra note 5, at 587.
10

In the case of Wood v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company
,
the Court
stated in its opinion that the Government, when consenting to the use
12
of a patent by an unlicensed contractor, should bear the burden of guilt.
13
However, indiscriminant infringement should not result in such guilt.
This decision has remained as a landmark decision, and in fact, this is
the origin of "authorization or consent."
The final case to be discussed, which put the Act of 1910 in the
interpreted form of today's 28 U.S.C. 1498 is that of Richmond Screw
14
Anchor Company v. United States
. Previous interpretations of the Act
of 1910 had stressed that the United States could be sued in patent
infringement cases, but in the Richmond case, it was decided that the
only recourse for a patent holder would be a suit against the Government
and not against the contractor. This provision does not apply when the
contractor does in fact possess a license to use the patent and the patent
owner decides to sue for some reason. In this case, the suit would be
between the patent holder and the contractor.
A portion of the Royalty Adjustment Act of 1942 (Section 6) reinforced
the Act of 1910 by specifically referring to "subcontractors" after some
16
discussion had arisen as to their inclusion under the law. Finally, the
12
Wood v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company , 296 Fed. 718 (S.D. Ala. 1924),
13
TeSelle, supra note 5, at 590: "When the government knows and obliges
the contractor to use the patented article, of course the government should
be willing to pay; but it will be going entirely too far to say that, because
any independent contractor for his own convenience saw fit to use the
patented article in doing government work, the government should pay for
such use by him, when they did not know he was using it."
1 Richmond Screw Anchor Company v. United States
,
275 U.S. 331 (1928).
TeSelle, supra note 5, at 591.
16United States Statutes at Large 1942
,
v. 56, part 1, p. 1014, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1943.
11

first paragraph of 1498 (a) was codified from the Act of 1910 in the
Act of May 29, 1949. The Act of October 31, 1951, which is in essence
Section 6 of the Royalty Adjustment Act of 1942, was inserted in the
U.S. Code as paragraph 2 of 1498 (a). These two actions, creating
the first two paragraphs of 28 U.S.C. 1498, have not been amended since
that time. In an area as dynamic as government contracting, it is
difficult to perceive these provisions remaining static.
United States Code, 28 U.S.C. 1498, p. 7596.
12

III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
When discussing interpretations of "authorization or consent," there
are two distinct periods of time. One is prior to 1958 and the other,
naturally, is after. The reasons for this division will become clear
as the problems faced by the patent holders and the Government are
developed. Going beyond the legal interpretations of infringement is
the more fundamental question as to what is the purpose of "authorization
or consent" legislation, and what are the motivations as perceived by the
various Federal departments (both civilian and military) which govern
contracting in this area.
18 19A review of the Congressional Record and the Digest of Public Bills
as of January 1974 has revealed no pending legislative proposals affecting
1498. Therefore, it may be concluded that there exists, at this time,
no great desire on the part of Congress, the Public or Federal departments
to modify this phase of procurement law. The recommendations of the
Commission on Government Procurement and some legislative proposals which
died in committee will be discussed later.
A search of the Decisions of the Comptroller General, volumes 1 - 37,
revealed only nine cases dealing with patent infringement. Volumes 1-37
cover a time-span of thirty-five years (1922 - 1957). During this time,
the legal authority for Government infringement of private patents was
18
United States of America Congressional Record
,
(various), United
States Government Printing Office.
19Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions
,
(various sessions
of Congress), Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
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in a statue-at-large (Act of July 1, 1918, 40 Stat. 705) and finally
the United States Code. This was an era of depression, European power
struggles and finally World War II; not the economic and social setting
in which patent infringement would be an explosive topic.
A. PRIOR TO 1958
There are two particular decisions, however, which illustrate the
policy of the period before 1958. In 13 Comp. Gen. 173 (1933), it was
stated that:
Where it is known with certainty that the use of valid patents is
required to manufacture supplies for the United States in accordance
with Government specifications, bidders properly may be required to
show legal right to use the patents, or the United States may directly
obtain such rights for its own use or use through its contractors,
. . .20 (emphasis added)
Two important points stand out in this decision: first, there is given
every indication that the list of bidders was being restricted in favor
of those holding a patent (or license) to a required invention. Second,
there was definite encouragement for the Government to obtain patent
rights prior to execution of the contract.
The second half of the decision states that:
. . . Where there is doubt as to the infringement of any valid patent,
the interests of the United States should be protected through including
in the contract a patent infringement indemnity clause . . .21
Here, the Comptroller General ruled on one more aspect of patent infringe-
ment; the requirement of a patent indemnity clause whereby the contractor
would be required to indemnify the Government. This was the first opinion





of the Comptroller General concerning infringement bonds. In a decision
of the next year, the Comptroller General determined that in the event
it could not be determined what patents would be involved in manufacture
for the United States, "... the question may be left to the courts
in a suit by those owning the patents claimed to be infringed, but the
contract as well as the surety bond should be in such terms that the
contractor and surety will be libel to the United States for damages which
the United States may be required to pay by reason of the violation by
22
the contractor of the patent rights of others."
The impact of these decisions on procurement, per se, is difficult to
evaluate, but there are certain points to be summarized, which were to be
modified in later decisions. First, bidders should possess a license or
the patent in question . This decision in and of itself casts doubt upon
the entire concept of eminent domain in the area of patents. Second,
the contractor is placed in the position of having to shoulder the burden
of liability by the inclusion of a patent indemnity clause.
There exists in both the comptroller decisions mentioned above an
element of presumption. The Comptroller General was taking upon himself
the decision-making function of the courts. In 13 Comp. Gen. 173, it was
stated that it should not be the function of the contracting officer to
determine if a patent is "valid" or simply "doubtful." The determination
of patent validity and infringement is a legal function. In 14 Comp. Gen.
298, again there exists an element of evaluation of patents. If it cannot
be established what the Government requires, then the contractor could not
be expected to be liable.
22
A-57194, October 10, 1934, 14 Comp. Gen. 298.
15

Although patent indemnification is not the primary subject of this
thesis, there are comments which must be made. First, there is no
statutory requirement to include a patent indemnification clause in
Government contracts. Indemnification is the process by which the
contractor is required to repay the Government for claims which are
paid based on patent infringement. Certainly the Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulation (ASPR) requires its use in specific situations, but
there appears to be *io statutory authority . J Even though there is no
statutory basis for inclusion of a patent indemnity clause, the Comptroller
General continued to espouse the philosophy that the Government must be
protected. In order to carry out the provisions of 14 Comp. Gen. 298
previously mentioned, the Comptroller General issued a decision only
19 days later stating:
In order to comply with the requirements of the decision of October
10, 1934, 14 Comp. Gen. 298 . . . the standard form of insurance bond
No. 25 should be amended by adding a patent infringement bond speci-
fically obligating the contractor and his surety "to hold the govern-
ment, its officers, agents, and employees, harmless from liability
of any nature or kind, including costs and expenses for or on account
of any patented invention, article or process manufactured or used
in the performance of that contract, including use by the Government
of the articles therein contracted for."
This decision is poorly worded in that the phrase, "including use by
the Government," implies that even after delivery, the contractor and
holder of the insurance bond may be liable. In a decision involving
interpretation of the patent indemnity clause, the Comptroller General
stated to a bidder:
. . . [a] contractor could not be held responsible if the Government,
after obtaining the contract material, should combine it with other
materials for use in such a way as to infringe some patent, . . . *
23Glassman, L. , "The Patent Indemnity Clause in Government Contracts,
G. W. Law Review , Vol. 25, 1957, p. 287.
24
A-57194, October 29, 1934, 14 Comp. Gen. 340.
25B-9252, April 17, 1940, 19 Comp. Gen. 876.
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This, then, represents the environment in which procurements involving
patents were made. The holder, either license or title, had a very
definite advantage in the source selection process. Contracting officers
were directed to select sources from among those possessing patents; and
where the exact effect of patent infringement was not known, bidders were
obliged to accept a patent indemnity clause to protect the Government.
These two factors no doubt contributed to the award of contracts not to
the lowest bidder, and probably did much to discourage smaller contractors
who could not afford' (or were not afforded) patent rights, and did not
relish the idea of indemnifying the Federal Government. As stated in an
article in the Federal Bar Journal :
Up until 1958, the patent owner who was otherwise qualified to bid
for a government contract was more often than not given preference
in the award of the contract.
B. POST 1958
The most important single decision in the area of patent infringement
27
rendered by the Comptroller General was the Herbert Cooper case. ' The
case involved an Air Force procurement for oxygen mask assemblies, and the
invitation for bids (IFB) was bid upon by seven contractors. The Herbert
Cooper Company was low bidder, but there were three of the seven companies
who possessed licenses for certain patented manufacturing and construction
techniques. The Herbert Cooper Company was not one of the three. The
Secretary of the Air Force requested a determination from the Comptroller
General as to the advisability of rejecting the Herbert Cooper bid and
awarding to one of the licensed bidders. As previously stated, up to this
point, the Comptroller General had encouraged the philosophy of generally
26
Rotondi, S. J., Jr., and Dobkin, J. A., "Government Competitive
Procurement and Patent Infringement: Substance and Solution," The Federal
Bar Journal
,
Vol 27, Summer 1967, p. 326.
27Unpublished decision of the Comptroller General B-136916, 25 Aug 1958.
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observing individual patent rights where possible. The decision thus
rendered was a remarkable shift in guidance and had sweeping repercussions
as shall be shown. The Comptroller General stated that:
In our opinion, to reject the low bid and make an award to one of
the licensees for the purpose of enforcing and protecting the rights
of the patent owners and their licensees would constitute an improper
restriction of competition under the circumstances, and would not
serve the interests of the United States which 28 U.S.C. 1498 was
intended to secure, but would limit the application of the provisions
of that statute. 28
The Secretary of the' Air Force requested clarification of this ruling
in view of the obvious policy shift and potential implications to all
formally advertised contracts. The Comptroller General therefore
expanded his decision and provided a published decision which read in
part:
It is suggested that the indiscriminate use of the right afforded
to the Government under 28 U.S.C. 1498 would be inimical to and
destructive of the public policy considerations underlying the
patent law. It is our view, however, that section 1498 appears
clearly to constitute a modification of the patent law by limiting
the rights of patentees insofar as procurement of supplies by the
Government may be concerned, and by vesting in the Government a
right to the use of any patents granted by it upon payment of
reasonable compensation for such use. We believe that the statute
is not consistent with any duty on the part of a contracting agency
of the Government to protect the interests of patentees or licensees
with respect to articles which it proposes to purchase, since the
statute itself defines and provides an exclusive remedy for enforce-
ment of the rights as to the Government. Any other interpretation
would appear to us to impose an impossible burden upon Government
procurement officials to determine the applicability and validity
of any patents affecting any articles desired.
Where procurement is to be made by formal advertising, it is our
opinion, notwithstanding what was said in 13 Comp. Gen. 173, that
there is no alternative to the securing of the maximum amount of
competition from firms qualified and willing to undertake the pro-
duction of articles, subject of course, to their willingness and








The decision 13 Comp. Gen. 173 has been previously discussed. The
doctrine of the Herbert Cooper case was expanded to cover all types of
procurement situations. Specifically, where negotiated procurements
are involved, the Comptroller General stated in a letter to Globe
Industries, Inc., who was protesting a Defense Supply Agency (DSA) award:
A rationale similar to the one of 38 Comp. Gen. 276 is applicable
to objections based on alleged patent infringement in contracts
awarded on a negotiated basis.
As a result of these decisions, there was a shift from preferential
treatment of contractors, to one of disregard of individual patent holders.
A search of the decisions of the Comptroller General, both published and
unpublished, subsequent to the Herbert Cooper case revealed over forty
cases based on patent infringement. This time period was from October
1958 through January 1974. [See Appendix A.] It would be statistically
unsound to attribute the magnitude of the increase to the Herbert Cooper
decision, as the number of patents issued was constantly increasing,
different procurement philosophies were in vogue, etc.. However, the
fact remains, there was an increase of nearly five-fold in protests to
the Comptroller General.
The majority of these protests were brought forward by patent holders
32
and licensees who were not awarded contracts. This basic policy, of
award without regard to the disposition of existing patent rights, has
remained to this date. A representative decision from the current decade
30
See supra note 20,
31
Unpublished decision of the Comptroller General, B-148135,
30 April 1962.
32Examples are: B-145164, May 24, 1961; B-147271, January 10, 1962;





is the case of the Jervis B. Webb Company. Webb protested the award
of a contract to Rapistan Incorporated for automated material handling
equipment. This was a contract awarded on an IFB let by the New Cumber-
land Army Depot. Jervis B. Webb Comapny held two pertinent patents,
but was not awarded the contract. In his decision, the Comptroller
General stated:
Considering the Act (28 U.S.C. 1498) and its purpose, this office
has concluded that Government contracts should not be restricted to
patent holders and' their licensees where patents are held, . . .
Specifically, we held in 38 Comp. Gen. 276 that a procurement agency
may not refuse to advertise for an item because of a patent nor refuse
to make award to the low bidder because he was not licensed by the
patent holder to manufacture the patented article. The procuring
agency, of course, is free to require patent indemnity agreements
from its suppliers, perhaps should require such agreements in some
cases. Even though patent indemnity is not provided for in the
invitation, it has been our view that a low bid may not be rejected
on the basis that the Government might incur liability for patent
infringement
. 45 Comp. Gen. 13.33 (emphasis added)
While the shift in policy of the Cooper case was abrupt and apparently
is a fixture in procurement philosophy today, the reasons behind the
change are not at all clear. One possible explanation is that 1958 was
the year of the statutory creation of NASA, and the beginning of the real
technological push by the United States. But, the explicit reason for
this decision is not as important as the implicit problems placed upon
patent holders.
C. THE DILEMMA OF THE PATENT HOLDER
The discussion of the interpretations of 1498 does not reflect the
problem associated with the interpretation. The basic fault with the
present interpretation of 1498 is the burden placed upon the patent




holder who feels his patent has been infringed. There exists a
dichotomy wherein the patent holder himself is now in a less advantageous
position than an unlicensed contractor. In the initial award to the
"lowest bidder," there perhaps is not an extensive argument that the
patent holder is at a disadvantage, but if the award is made to an
unlicensed contractor, the patent holder's problems begin. In discussing
the Decision of the Comptroller General subsequent to the Herbert Cooper
case, Leonard Rawicz, then Patent Counsel, Goddard Space Flight Center,
said:
These decisions have produced some criticism in that some view that
the purpose of 28 U.S.C. 1498 was to assure patent litigation free
procurement only during a national emergency or war; that across the
board use by the Government agencies of Section 1498 is an abuse of
discretion; and that this statute is destructive of patent rights and
the American Patent System as it allows infringement to occur without
any real recourse by the patent owner, because of the delays and costs
attendant to a suit in the Court of Claims or the reluctance of the
Executive agencies to use their administrative authorities to settle
infringement claims equitably ,-3H
There exists other factors which place the patent holder and patent
licensee in a disadvantageous position. The patent holder may be very
reluctant to initiate litigation in the Court of Claims for reasons other
than cost alone; even though the cost of a simple infringement suit has
been estimated at an "actual out-of-pocket cost" has been estimated by
35Yeaton at $250,000 and in complex suits, much more. There is also
the chance that the instant patent will be declared invalid; such suits
34
Rawicz, L., The Effects of Asserted Patents and Other Proprietary
Rights on Government Procurement
,
paper presented to the Federal Bar
Association Convention, Chicago, Illinois: 17 September 1965.
35
Yeaton, S. C. , "The Administrative Claim Procedure," Federal Bar
Journal
,
Vol. 25, 1965, p. 108.
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could, in the mind of the patent holder, place him in an unfavorable
position for future procurements; or the patent holder may not be able
to devote personnel for the time required for a suit.
The patent holder gets hit in another way also. Since the possession
of a license by a contractor is of no value when bids are evaluated, what
is the incentive to enter into licensing agreements when the Government
will pick up the tab for patent litigation. It has been stated in an
excellent work on patent infringement:
There is no question that the current practice simplifies the pro-
curement process by removing the rather complex variable of a bidder's
patent and its relevance to the procurement. On the other hand,
awarding a contract to the "low bidder" and later compensating the
patent owner could ultimately cost the Government more than awarding
the contract to the patent owner or one of his licensees.-3 "
An issue which should be disposed of at this point is patent indemni-
fication. Basically, there are two views concerning patent indemnity.
The Department of Defense has determined that generally, when an item is
procured "off the shelf" or has been previously produced in the commercial
market place, then the contractor should indemnify the government by way
of the patent indemnity clause.-3 ' There are two strong caveats, however,
which practically render the notion of patent indemnification meaningless.
These are the fact that the infringement must be adjudged by a court of
competent jurisdiction (the Court of Claims) o_r the administrative settle-
38
ment made with the consent of the contractor. As stated by R. Y. Peters:
It should be noted that this problem of obtaining the consent of con-
tractor-indemnitors to settlements is one of the primary problems in
the use of indemnity clauses . . .
36
Allnutt, R. F. and Morsinghoff, G. J., "Patent Infringement in Govern-









This and other considerations, such as the deterrence of com-
petition, or increased bid prices through the inclusion of contin-
gencies for possible infringement liability, have led the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration to adopt a policy of not
requiring patent indemnity except in limited situations involving
specifically identified patents. 39
There exists very little court data concerning liability as the result
of the patent indemnity clause. The impression received from reviewing
literature concerning patent indemnity may best be summed up by referring
to an old decision and a relatively new study. In the decision of the
Supreme Court when interpreting the 1918 amendment to the Act of 1910
they said:
The purpose of the amendment was to relieve the contractor entirely
from liability of every kind for the infringement of patents in manu-
facturing anything for the Government ... ^0
In expressing their findings, the Aerospace Industries Association stated
in a report on Federal patent policy:
The requirement on contractors to indemnify the Government against
claims for patent infringement is inequitable in that adequate
reserves for contingent liabilities cannot be provided for by the
contractor, such requirements increase costs to the Government, and
they are contrary to Congressional intent as expressed in 28 U.S.C.
1498. 41
There are also indications that the use of the patent indemnity clause
also places a burden on the Government and may be self-defeating. In
their final report, the Commission on Government Procurement stated:
There is evidence that in some cases, despite the inclusion of
indemnity clauses in contracts, contractors have avoided liability
for infringement. The cost to the Government of bringing suit
39
Patents and Technical Data
,
Government Contracts Monograph No. 10,
p. 96, The George Washington University, 1967.
See supra note 14.
41Aerospace Industries Association, supra note 2, at 20.
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against uncooperative contractors/indemnitors may result in their
avoiding full indemnification. z
Based upon the previously cited lack of judicial awards against indemnitors
and what appears to be the thrust of 1498 in Richmond Screw Anchor Co .
v. United States which is referred to above, it would appear that rather
than the cost of litigation it might be the low odds of sufficient
recovery which thwarts the suit.
The second general view of patent indemnity is held by NASA. The
policy of NASA is to restrict the use of the patent indemnity clause to
43
only a few situations, and then only to patents specifically identified.
The reader is invited to the excellent article by Lawrence Glassman
titled, "The Patent Indemnity Clause in Government Contracts."
D. ASPR AND NASA AUTHORIZATION AND CONSENT
The Armed Services Procurement Regulations and NASA Procurement
Regulations are in general agreement concerning authorization and consent
clauses used in their respective contracts. The one difference is that
NASA does not include the statement of liability in the clause for
supplies, as does DOD. The two basic authorization and consent clauses
deal with either research and development contracts or supplies contracts.
The ASPR clause to be included in research and development contracts states:
The Government hereby gives its authorization and consent for
all use and manufacture of any invention described in and covered by
42Commission on Government Procurement, Report of the Commission
on Government Procurement
,
Vol. 4, p. 120, 31 December 1972.
43
Code of Federal Regulations, Vol. 41, Ch. 18, para. 18-9. 104(a) (1973)
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See supra note 23.
24

a patent of the United States in the performance of this contract or
any part hereof or any amendment hereto or any subcontract hereunder
(including any lower-tier subcontract). -*
This clause is to be included in research and development contracts or
mixed research and development and supply contracts where the main pur-
pose of the contract is the experimental portion. The exception for
the inclusion of the clause is the case where performance and delivery
of the contract is outside the United States, its possession or Puerto
Rico.
The clause to be included in contracts for supplies and services is
much more restrictive than the clause for research and development as to
the conditions under which "authorization or consent" is granted. The
clause is lengthy, however its inclusion at this point is necessary to
show the marked difference in scope.
The Government hereby gives its authorization and consent (without
prejudice to any rights of indemnification) for all use and manufac-
ture, in the performance of this contract or any part hereof or any
amendment hereto or any subcontract hereunder (including any lower-
tier subcontract) , of any invention described in and covered by a
patent of the United States.
(i) embodied in the structure or composition of any article the
delivery of which is accepted by the Government under this contract,
or,
(ii) utilized in the machinery, tools or methods of use of which
necessarily results from compliance by the contractor or the using
subcontractor with
(a) specifications or written provisions now or hereafter forming
a part of this contract, or





(b) specific written instructions given by the contracting officer
directing the manner of performance
The entire liability to the Government for infringement of a patent
of the United States shall be determined solely by the provisions of
the indemnity clause, if any, included in this contract or any sub-
contract hereunder (including any lower-tier subcontract), and the
Government assumes liability for all other infringement to the extent
of the authorization and consent hereinabove granted. (paragraphs
added). 47
This clause is included in supply and services contracts except for the
exception noted for the research and development clause, or when the
research and development clause is used in a mixed research and supply
48
contract. The supply clause is much more restrictive to the contractor
in that there are specific phases such as "which is accepted," or "speci-
fications or written provisions . . ."or "specific written instructions
. .
.." All these requirements tend to place the contractor in a more
precarious position insofar as being subject to an injunction by the
patent holder is concerned. If a court were to determine that the con-
tractor had infringed an existing patent in the absence of authorization
and consent, then an injunction would quite probably be issued and the
contractor could be facing suit in a District Court (as opposed to the
Court of Claims where the provisions of 1498 are involved, and where the
defendent would be the Government).
An injunction against a contractor involved in a Government contract
an only occur when the contracting officer fails to exercise his options
available to prevent it. There could be circumstances where it is felt
that the best interests of the Government would be served by permitting
an injunction. There are numerous methods which could be employed by





the Government to avert an injunction, such as amendment of the contract
to include the broad authorization and consent clause if any research
is involved, execute a supplemental agreement to require the use of an
infringing process or machine, or in the case of articles, accept a token
unit which then would insure "authorization and consent." An excellent
analysis of the options available to the Government ot avert an injunction
49
which includes the above, has been written by Walter Henderson.
In the event that authorization or consent is not expressed, as would
be in the above cases, there also exists the doctrine of "Implied Consent."
An early landmark case involving implied authorization and consent was
the case of Allgrunn v. United States . The decision of the court was
that the process in question (Here a process for rifling operation in
the manufacture of guns) was of such a technical breakthrough that, "It
is inconceivable that any other course would or could have been pursued."
Writing for the George Washington University, R. Y. Peters has compiled
the following factors which often are germane to the determination of
authorization and consent:
(1) knowledge by the contracting officer or other Government official
of the use of a patented invention by the contractor and the lack
of objection to such use;
(2) the requirement of such use by the contracting officer or other
Government officials;
(3) a direct benefit accepted by the Government resulting from the




"Government Authorization and Consent to Infringe:
Problems in Defense Procurement," Federal Bar Journal
,
Vol. 23, p. 134-
146, 1963.
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Allgrunn v. United States
,





(4) a requirement in the contract that the contractor obtain maximum
production which necessarily resulted in a product containing
ingredients covered by a patent and knowledge by the Government
officials of such circumstances;
(5) the presence of an authorization and consent clause in the prime
contract, although no such clause is included in the subcontract;
(6) although there is no authorization and consent clause in the con-
tract, the occurence of the conditions of ASPR 9-102.1 (the
supplies authorization and consent clause) such as acceptance of
articles covered by a patent by the Government, or use of machinery
or methods necessarily results from compliance with the contract
specifications or written instructions of the contracting officer;
(parentheses added)
(7) where an invitation to bid specifies that the subject matter of
the contract is the patent owner's article (for example, by brand
name and model number) or equal.-5
The above list is based upon court decisions in most cases. Perhaps the
most obvious condition which could be interpreted as granting authori-
zation and consent is that which has become known as "The Christian
Doctrine." This case involved litigation arising from the failure of
a contract to include a required termination clause. The court, holding
that ASPR had the force and effect of law, read into the contract the
theory that in order for the contract to be valid, the clause must be
present and the contracting officer had no authority to contract contrary
to regulations. 3 Therefore, if an authorization and consent clause is
not included in a contract under conditions mandated by Chapter VII and
Chapter IX of ASPR, it may well be read in. In addition, the Comptroller
General has ruled that except in an extremely unusual circumstance the
contracting officer had no authority to expressly withhold authorization
and consent.
52Supra note 39, at 87-88.
53Cibinic, J. and Nash, R. C. , Federal Procurement Law
,
2d ed., The
George Washington University, p. 52, 1969.
^Unpublished decision of the Comptroller General B-159356 (1966).
28

This rather brief discussion is not intended to fully coyer the
entire scope of authorization and consent vis-a-vis contracts, but rather
to once more highlight the plight of the patent holder. In this instance,
the patent holder would experience a great deal of difficulty in bringing
a suit against an infringing contractor because of the broad inter-
pretation conferred upon the concept of "authorization and consent." The
problem of the patent holder is real, but this is not to imply that the
Government should subject itself to contract slowdowns simply because
it is costly for the patent holder to enter the Court of Claims. The
use of the restrictive form of authorization and consent clause (ASPR
9-102.1), however, is questionable, and the majority of "implied authori-
zation and consent" interpretations have arisen in an effort to fit the
restrictions of the clause. Specific conclusions and recommendations
concerning authorization and consent will be presented in the appropriate
chapters.
E. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
As stated in the beginning of theis thesis, a review of pending legi-
slative bills failed to reveal a single one directed towards 1498. There
were several attempts in the past, however, which received attention but
failed to make it out of Committee. Two of the more widely discussed
bills will be briefly reviewed.
1. The Williams Bill, S. 1047
The Williams Bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 1047 in 1965
and again as S. 731 in January of 1967. The bill was referred to the
Committee on Judiciary and there it died. In total, there were sixteen
bills introduced in the 89th Congress which were similar to the Williams
29

Bill. 55 The Williams Bill would have modified 1498 by the addition of a
new paragraph stating that: ("this section referring to 28 U.S.C. 1A98)
Nothing in the section shall be construed to authorize the use or
manufacture by or for the United States of any invention described
in and covered by a patent of the United States, which has not pre-
viously been held invalid by an unappealed or unappealable judgment
or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, without license of
the owner thereof, unless the Secretary of Defense or his delegate,
shall determine in the case of each such invention that the national
security of the United States requires such use or manufacture.
The Department of Defense and the Comptroller General both displayed dis-
approval of the bill, while a segment of industry, most notably the
Chemical Industry, supported the bill. Speaking for the Department of
Defense, Mr. J. M. Malloy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense stated:
. .
.
[T]he Department of Defense strongly opposes S. 1047. The only
amendment to 28 U.S.C. 1498 we would recommend is to permit a suit by
a patent owner directly against an infringing contractor in a case in
which the Government is satisfied that infringement has taken place,
and the contractor has indemnified the Government against patent
infringement but refuses to settle. Other than this type of amend-
ment, a practical way to accord greater recognition to patent owners
is to restore discretion to contracting officers to deal solely with
patents owners and their licensees in appropriate circumstances. This
would require amendments to the procurement statutes. (emphasis added.)
This short statement, in this author's opinion, is the heart of the
entire problem of inequitable treatment of patent holders and licensees.
When Mr. Williams reintroduced his bill as S. 731 in 1967, his
intentions again seemed laudable, but the inclusion in the Congressional
Record of a lengthy resolution from the International Chemical Workers
Union, AFL-CIO seemed to detract from procurement problems and reflected






the needs of labor with respect to foreign procurements only! A portion
of the resolution which still referred to S. 1047 stated:
. . . the New Jersey State AFL-CIO in Convention voice support for
Senator William's Bill S-1047 . . . designed to protect and strengthen
the American patent system by insuring that no government agency be
permitted to purchase products manufactured abroad through stolen or
infringed American patents • • •
It is rather difficult to relate the phrase "no government agency . . .
manufactured abroad" to the stated intent of S. 1047 and S. 731. Perhaps
this is one reason they never emerged again.
2. The Morris Bill, H.R. 10022
The Morris Bill, H.R. 10022 in the 89th Congress and H.R. 2898 in
the 90th Congress met the same fate as the Williams' Bills; death by
committee. The approach taken by representative Morris was to expand
existing procurement statutes namely the Armed Services Procurement Act
of 1947 and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949.
The basis of H.R. 10022 was to permit an additional exception to the
existing seventeen exceptions to formal advertising. This exception
would arise if a patent infringement would result from an award and would
permit negotiation among the patent holder and licensees only. A detailed
analysis of H.R. 10022 has been made by Alnutt and Mossinghoff in their
previously cited article. When Representative Morris reintroduced his
bill as H.R. 2898 in the 90th Congress, 1st Session, the approach had been
changed to recommend a Government-wide preprocurement licensing approach.
The bill was designed to:
. . . authorize the procurement of patent licensees and the consider-




p. 1894, 30 January 1967,
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bids or offers in situations where, after formal advertising for bids
or solicitations of negotiated offers, an allegation or patent infringe-
ment is received by the contracting officer. 59
The Morris bills certainly captured the plight of the patent holder
and seemed to be a direct attack on the problem. Neither of the above
bills reported out of Committee. (H.R. 2898 was referred to the Committee
on Government Operations.)
F. NASA'S "INSTANT LICENSE"
One of the few innovations in the area of patent licensing is the
pre-procurement licensing policy used by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. This policy is specified in NASA Procurement
Regulation 9-102. NASA requested that the Comptroller General rule on
the applicability and viability of this new approach. The purpose of
this new change is best seen from a NASA Procurement Regulation Directive
issued subsequent to the Comptroller General's decision to permit a test
of this policy. In NASA's words:
This policy provides that upon timely notice by a patent owner that
a proposed NASA procurement will infringe his privately owned U.S.
patent, and upon a determination by NASA patent counsel that the
procurement will result in an infringement, NASA will enter into a
license agreement with the patent owner for that procurement only
if certain conditions are satisfied. u
This is a major deviation from existing policy whereby NASA will become
a licensee prior to procurement.
The Comptroller General decision in response to NASA's letter requests
of 13 June and 14 July 1966 was extremely lengthy and presented a great
deal of background on 28 U.S.C. 1498. Several points as made by NASA
59Congressional Record Index, 90th Congress, p. 1693, 1968.
NASA Procurement Regulation Directive No. 66-10 (Oct. 24, 1966)
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are referenced by the Comptroller General and are worth, quoting. In
speaking of NASA, the Comptroller General stated:
You advise that as a practical matter, section 1498 does not always
afford an adequate and effective remedy to the patent holder. Small
business concerns, for example, often are loath to engage in pro-
tracted litigation with the Government, and administrative settlements
tend to be time consuming and costly.
and
Further you report that NASA does not generally include "patent indem-
nity" clauses in its contracts. You explain that there are several
reasons for this. Such clauses may have the effect of unnecessarily
increasing contract costs because of the inclusion of a contingency
for patent infringement. They discourage some prospective bidders
from bidding . . . °
and
at present, the unlicensed firm is offered free use of a patent on a
Government contract. Consequently, where a patented invention would
be useful on Government programs, a prospective licensee would be
discouraged from taking out a license on the patent when free use
of it is likely to be offered by the Government . You feel that
privately financed research is definitely discouraged under the
current practice, with the Government as the ultimate loser. *
(emphasis added)
The above quotations, expressing NASA's concern over the then existing
state of patent infringement and indemnity was strongly worded and, in
fact, a condemnation of existing policies. The Comptroller General
agreed with NASA in principle, and approved the proposal for an unspeci-
fied trial period. The general form of NASA's pre-procurement licensing
policy is as follows:
1. All invitations to bidders would contain a "Patent Royalties"
clause, signifying NASA's willingness to enter into a licensing
agreement with the patent holder for the specific procurements only.







Code of Federal Regulations, Vol. 41, Ch. 18, para. 18-9.102-2(1973).
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2. The patent holder gives NASA "timely notice" that the procurement
will infringe specific patents, and if
3. NASA's patent counsel then confirms the possibility of infringe-
ment and the apparent (at least) validity of the patent, and
4. The Contracting Officer determines that the licensing agreement
will not unduly delay procurement, and
5. The patent holder agrees to license NASA at a rate not to exceed
the lowest previously executed commercial royalty agreement, then
6. The agreed upon royalty rate becomes a factor in bid evaluation
and in the event award is made to an unlicensed contractor, NASA
will pay the royalty to the patent holder.
For a detailed analysis of the original NASA pre-procurement licensing
approach, the reader is referred to the previously cited article from
the Notre Dame Lawyer
. This policy has not been widely used. For one
reason, in 1970, by NASA PRD 70-14 of 2 November the use of this concept
was restricted in the research and development field to those procure-
ments resulting in hardware or the use of specific processes. The
original approach by NASA still remains as the only agency challenge to
the decision of the Comptroller General prohibiting the use of the
possibility of patent infringement as a factor in bid evaluations. The
inherent soundness of the NASA pre-procurement licensing policy was
strongly stated by Study Group No. 6 in their final report for inclusion
in the Report of the Commission on Government Procurement:
The acquisition of licenses prior to use should be encouraged as the
most efficient and equitable method for recognizing private patent
rights and for reducing administrative claims and court actions. As
a model of how each agency might handle this responsibility, we point
to the pre-procurement licensing procedures of NASA.
Supra note 36, at 21.
66
Commission on Government Procurement, Final Report Prepared by Study
Group No. 6 V. 6, p. 431, 1972.
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III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following conclusions and recommendations are those of the author
and are based on a review of the material as reflected in the bibliography
and references as presented in this thesis. The recommendations to be
found in the Report of the Commission on Government Procurement are in
some cases reflected below and in some cases not. It is generally
accepted that the Report of the Commission reflects the largest and most
complete study of Government procurement ever done. The following con-
clusions and recommendations are therefore, not meant to be in competition
with those of the report, and are more restricted in scope dealing only
with those areas directly related to 28 U.S.C. 1498.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The patent holder does not enjoy an equal let alone a preferred
position in the award of bids.
2. 28 U.S.C. 1498 does perform its intended function: that of
insuring continuation of work by the bar to injunction, and it
provides an avenue for the patent holder to seek redress.
3. The interpretations placed upon 28 U.S.C. 1498 by the Comptroller
General encourage the unauthorized use of patents. (The exception
being NASA.)
4. The patent indemnity clauses as used from ASPR are of little value
• in shifting liability from the Government to the contractor for
infringement.
5. The restrictive authorization and consent clauses are contrary
to the intent of 28 U.S.C. 1498.
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6. Legislative changes which have been proposed have not had suf-
ficient support, and it is unlikely that efforts to change
28 U.S.C. 1498 will succeed.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. All Federal agencies should be granted statutory authority to
procure licenses. (Department of Transportation, for example,
has no such authority.)
2. All Federal agencies should be encouraged to develop pre-procare-
ment licensing policies similar to NASA.
3. 28 U.S.C. 1498 should not be modified, as it is sufficient to
protect the patent holder given changes in pre-procurement
licensing.
4. NASA's policy concerning patent indemnification should be adopted
by all procuring agencies. (Patent indemnification generally not
used except in specific item procurements.)
5. Only the broad authorization and consent clauses should be used
in contracts. The restrictive clauses of ASPR and NASAPR are
contrary to the intent of 28 U.S.C. 1498.
As an area of further study, it is suggested that a pilot procurement
system be developed to evaluate the effect of pre-procurement licensing.
This could be accomplished by two procurements, for example, each requiring
the use of a patented article or process. In one case, the pre-procurement
licensing approach could be used and in the other, business as usual. The
final costs could then be compared.
The area of patent rights and individual rights, for that matter, are
going to be of ever-increasing concern. This paper has indicated that there
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